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Separating Business Decisions and Fiduciary Duty in 
ERISA Litigation?* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the enactment of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA) in 1974, employers have been able to wear the twin hats of 
ERISA pension plan "sponsor" and "administrator." 1 As a plan 
administrator, an employer may owe plan participants a fiduciary duty, 
but no such duty is triggered when the employer acts only in its 
sponsoring capacity. Courts have held that when acting as a fiduciary of 
an employee retirement plan, the employer must "discharge his duties 
with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and 
beneficiaries. "2 (Employers are viewed as fiduciaries of a plan when 
they are named as such in the written plan or when they have some 
discretionary authority over the administration of the planY Neverthe-
less, the courts have also recognized the rights of companies to make 
"business decisions" free from their ERISA fiduciary responsibilities and, 
consequently, from the obligation of acting exclusively for the benefit of 
plan participants. As stated in Sutton v. ~irton Stee/: 4 
[W]hen acting on behalf of the pension fund, there is no doubt that [an 
employer] must act solely to benefit participants and beneficiaries. 
However . . . the mere fact that a company has named itself as pension 
plan administrator or trustee does not restrict it from pursuing 
* Copyright ro 1996 by Mary 0. Jensen. 
1. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1988). 
2. See, e.g., Local 144 Nursing Home Pension Fund v. Demisay, 113 S. Ct. 2252, 
2259 (1993); 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1). 
3. Specifically, ERISA provides that: 
[A] person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he exercises any 
discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of such plan 
or exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition of its 
assets, (ii) he renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or 
indirect, with respect to any moneys or other property of such plan, or has any 
authority or responsibility to do so, or (iii) he has any discretionary authority or 
discretionary responsibility in the administration of such plan. 
29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A). 
4. Sutton v. Weirton Steel Div. ofNat'l Steel Corp., 567 F. Supp. 1184 (N.D.W.Va.), 
aff'd, 724 F.2d 406 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1205 (1984). 
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reasonable business behavior in negotiations concerning pension benefits 
not otherwise affected by the requirements of ERISA. 5 
While this delineation of responsibilities seems fairly clear-cut (i.e., 
the employer must merely identify which hat he is wearing at any given 
time), in practice the distinctions are far from apparent. Communications 
between the company and pension plan participants or beneficiaries are 
of particular concern when modifications of the plan are in various stages 
of discussion. In fact, the tension between the concepts of fiduciary 
responsibility and business decisions threatens to become more pro-
nounced with several recent circuit and district court decisions. These 
decisions seem to extend the fiduciary duty to disclose communications 
with employees though the subject of those communications may still fall 
within the realm of a non-fiduciary business decision. A careful reading 
of these cases reveals that in almost every instance the courts have held 
only that a company must refrain from making material misrepresenta-
tions to employees. 6 The problem of determining whether non-communi-
cation can constitute a material misrepresentation has only been 
marginally addressed and, inevitably, must be considered more fully. 
Many businesses express concern that imposing an affirmative duty 
to disclose prospective plan changes to employees could constitute an 
additional burden on them. However, the language and legislative intent 
of ERISA, as well as the common law of trusts, supports the recent court 
decisions which expand the fiduciary duty of employers. Part I of this 
comment analyzes the duties of a fiduciary as outlined under the statutory 
language of ERISA. Further, it considers ERISA reporting requirements 
by examining case law which attempts to define the relationship between 
fiduciary duty and reporting. 
Part II analyzes fiduciary duty and disclosure in light of legislative 
intent, federal common law, and the common law of trusts. This analysis 
concludes that under some conditions triggering of fiduciary duty also 
invokes an affirmative duty to disclose. 
Part III considers the extent that communication between an 
employer, functioning as plan sponsor and administrator, and plan partici-
pants should trigger fiduciary duty and, therefore, the duty to disclose. 
It concludes that federal common law and legislative intent, combined 
with the common law of trusts, provide a rational basis for presuming 
5. /d. at 1201. 
6. See, e.g., Vartanian v. Monsanto Co., 14 F.3d 697 (1st Cir. 1994); Kurz v. 
Philadelphia Elec. Co., 994 F.2d 136 (3rd Cir. 1993); Fischer v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 994 
F.2d 130 (3rd Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 622 (1993); Drennan v. General Motors 
Corp., 977 F.2d 246 (6th Cir. 1992); Berlin v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 858 F.2d 1154 (6th 
Cir. 1988). 
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that most communications should invoke fiduciary duties. Furthermore, 
Part III discusses when silence should be viewed as communication and 
the impact expansion of fiduciary duties would have employers. 
II. ERISA-THE STATUTE 
A. Duties of a Fiduciary Under ERISA 
There are three main components of the statutory fiduciary duty 
imposed by ERISA. 7 First, the express language of ERISA requires that 
a fiduciary of an employment plan be loyal to employees and "discharge 
his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants 
and beneficiaries. "8 Second, ERISA regulations rely on the "prudent 
man rule" which requires a fiduciary to act "with the care, skill, 
prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a 
prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters 
would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like 
aims. "9 This combined standard of the "prudent man" and loyalty 
"imposes an unwavering duty on an ERISA trustee to make decisions 
with single-minded devotion to a plan's participants and beneficiaries and, 
in so doing, to act as a prudent person would act in a similar situa-
tion. "1° Finally, ERISA requires a fiduciary to act "for the exclusive 
purpose" of providing benefits to plan participants. 11 
7. Berlin, 858 F.2d at 1162 (citing Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263,271 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1069 (1982)). 
8. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1988). 
9. /d. § 1104(a)(1)(B). The specific fiduciary duties outlined in ERISA are those in 
section 1104(a)(1) which states: 
(a)(1) [A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely 
in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and-
(A) for the exclusive purpose of: 
(i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; 
and 
(ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan; 
(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circum-
stances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and 
familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of 
a like character and with like aims; 
(C) by diversifying the investments of the plan so as to minimize 
the risk of large losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly 
prudent not to do so; and 
(D) in accordance with the documents and instruments governing 
the plan insofar as such documents and instruments are consistent with 
the provisions of this subchapter .... 
/d. § 1104(a)(1). 
10. Morse v. Stanley, 732 F.2d 1139, 1145 (2d Cir. 1984). 
11. Berlin, 858 F.2d at 1162. 
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Although ERISA regulations allow an employer to act both as a 
sponsor and as a pension plan administrator, once within the realm of 
fiduciary, the employer is not permitted to mix loyalties; he must act 
solely for the benefit of the plan participants. 
B. ERISA Disclosure and Reporting Duties 
While the express language of ERISA establishes the obligation of 
fiduciaries to act on behalf of plan participants and beneficiaries, the 
statutory language does not mention the fiduciary duty to disclose. 
Rather, the discussion of disclosure in ERISA is confined to sections 
associated with reporting duties. 
ERISA regulations require that plan participants be provided with a 
summary plan description within ninety days of their entry into the 
program, or, within 120 days of the plan becoming subject to ERISA 
reporting rules. 12 The plan summary must be written in a way "calculat-
ed to be understood by the average plan participant" and must be 
"sufficiently comprehensive to apprise plan participants and beneficiaries 
of their rights and obligations." 13 In addition, ERISA regulations 
require that participants be provided a summary of any material 
modifications to the plan within 210 days after the end of the plan year 
in which the modification was adopted. 14 
Nothing in either the sections of ERISA dealing with fiduciary duty 
or in those concerned with disclosure rules specifically consider the 
relationship between the two sets of regulations. It may be argued that 
because ERISA does not speak on the issue, there is no duty to disclose 
or report beyond that outlined. Thus, there is no fiduciary duty to 
disclose. Indeed, in Acosta v. Pacific Enterprises, 15 the court found that 
the disclosure provisions of ERISA's Section 1104(a) establish the only 
reporting and disclosure requirements of the act. 16 The issue in Acosta 
was whether providing a list of plan participants was included within the 
sphere of "fiduciary duty." The court reasoned that under Section 
1104(a), fiduciary duties "relate to the obligation to provide benefits to 
plan participants, to defray reasonable expenses in administering the plan, 
and to act with the requisite care and skill in conducting the affairs of 
employee benefit and pension plans." 17 Thus, the court held that "[i]t 
12. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1024(a)(1)(B), 1024(b)(1); 29 C.F.R. §§ 2520.104a-2(a), 2520.104b-
2(a)(1)-(2) (1994). 
13. 29 C.P.R.§ 2520.102-2(a) (1994). 
14. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1022(a)(1), 1024(b)(1)(B); 29 C.F.R. § 2520.104b-3(a) (1994). 
15. Acosta v. Pacific Enters., No. CV89 1172 RB (C.D. Cal. 1989). 
16. /d. 
17. /d. 
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would be a great stretch to interpret Section 1104(a) to imply an obliga-
tion on the part of a plan's fiduciaries to disclose, as part of their Section 
1104(a) obligations, lists of all plan participants to any one participant 
upon request . . . . Such a duty would be unrelated to the purposes of 
Section 1104(a), viz, paying benefits, defraying expenses, and making 
prudent investments. •>~B 
Likewise, in Porto v. Armco, 19 the Eighth Circuit declined to extend 
the fiduciary duty to disclose beyond ERISA's statutory reporting and 
disclosure requirements. The plaintiff, Porto, aware that his choice was 
irrevocable under the terms of the plan had elected a particular retirement 
settlement. Armco later amended the plan to permit revocation of the 
previously irrevocable elections. While Armco informed active 
employees of the modification approximately one month later, Porto did 
not learn of the change until he spoke with a plan administrator ten 
months later. Moreover, Porto was not formally told of the amendment 
until a revised plan summary was sent to him over one year after the 
announcement to active employees. 20 Porto claimed that Armco had 
breached its fiduciary duties by not informing him of the changes at the 
same time that it notified active employees. In its opinion, the court 
maintained that "the district court did not err in holding that an adminis-
trator who complies with the statutory standard for disclosure cannot be 
said to have breached [his] fiduciary duty by not providing earlier 
disclosure. "21 
Similarly, in Payonk v. HMW Industries, 22 the plaintiffs brought an 
action alleging a breach of fiduciary duty because HMW did not inform 
them of a pending plan termination. The Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit concluded that: 
HMW, as plan administrator, would not normally be aware of the 
decision making process until after a decision on termination (or on any 
other plan change brought about by reason of a business decision) had 
been made by HMW as employer. This may explain why the regula-
tions do not require HMW as administrator to disclose or provide notice 
of, an intention to terminate until HMW as administrator is in a position 
to file with the PBGC. Since the statute expressly sanctions an employer 
wearing 'two hats,' we can perceive no reason why HMW's decision 
to terminate its plan should put Payonk in a better position than Payonk 
18. /d. 
19. Porto v. Armco, Inc., 825 F.2d 1274 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 937 
(1988). 
20. !d. at 1275. 
21. /d. at 1276. 
22. Payonk v. HMW Indus., 883 F.2d 221 (3rd Cir. 1989). 
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would otherwise have been in had someone other than HMW been the 
plan administrator. 23 
Finally, in Kytle v. Stewart Title, 24 the plaintiff claimed that the 
trustees of a health insurance plan breached their fiduciary duty by not 
disclosing an amendment to the plan prior to the date that ERISA 
regulations would have required notification. Borrowing reasoning from 
Porto, the court concluded that Stewart had not violated its fiduciary 
duties because ERISA rules required only that Kytle be informed within 
210 days after the close of the plan year in which the amendment was 
made. 25 
III. ERISA REPORTING RULES IN LIGHT OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT, 
FEDERAL COMMON LAW, AND THE COMMON LAW OF TRUSTS 
Although the above case law supports a rather rigid reading of 
ERISA reporting requirements, these analyses seem flawed. The 
legislative intent of the ERISA statutes, the federal common law which 
has arisen around ERISA, and the common law of trusts all indicate that 
this rigid reading is not supportable. 
A. Legislative Intent 
As mentioned previously, there is no language in ERISA which 
connects fiduciary duty with the disclosure and reporting rules. 
Admittedly, some connection may have been intended, but no language 
indicates that the disclosure requirements can not be augmented by 
judicial decision. Indeed, the 1986 amendment, which extended the time 
for notice to plan participants from ten to sixty days, 26 indicates the 
intention that earlier notice be given sooner and that statutory require-
ments be seen as minimum standards. 
Further, it is not tenable to argue that ERISA's legislative purpose 
is to provide the controlling parameters of plan participants' notification 
rights. ERISA was enacted to insure protection of employees' rights to 
pensions and benefits. 27 From its inception the act was seen as remedia-
tion for a general lack of employee information and employer disclosure 
23. ld. at 229. 
24. Kytle v. Stewart Title Co., 788 F. Supp. 321 (S.D. Tex. 1992). 
25. Id. at 324. 
26. 29 U.S.C. § 134l(a)(2). 
27. See S. REP. No. 127, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1973), reprinted in 1974 
U.S. C. C. A.N. 4838. "[This legislation addresses] the issue of whether American working men 
and women shall receive private pension plan benefits which they have been led to believe 
would be theirs upon retirement from working lives. It responds by mandating protective 
measures, and prescribing minimum standards for promised benefits." /d. 
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concerning pension plans, etc. 28 Specifically, Congressional records 
note that "[t]he intent of the [Senate Labor and Public Welfare] 
Committee is to provide the full range of legal and equitable remedies 
available in both state and federal courts and to remove jurisdictional and 
procedural obstacles which in the past appear to have hampered effective 
enforcement of fiduciary responsibilities under state law or recovery of 
benefits due to participants. "29 Prior to ERISA, fewer than five percent 
of workers leaving employers who provided pension benefits received 
those benefits. 30 Employers denied workers their expected benefits in 
a variety of ways. Many employees lost their benefits because of 
stringent vesting requirements, or because employers terminated plans. 31 
Others lost benefits through fiduciary incompetence and fraud. 32 ERISA 
regulations must be viewed as minimal standards when establishing 
breach of duty but which are intended to be explained and supplemented 
by judicial interpretation. 
B. Federal Common Law 
Judicial interpretation has created a body of federal common law 
surrounding ERISA. The First Circuit indicated in Palino v. Casey33 
that a duty to disclose plan modifications may, under some circumstances, 
supplement the express rules of ERISA. In particular, the court noted 
28. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001; H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted 
in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4639-43; H.R. REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), 
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4670, 4676-77; S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) 
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4851; S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), 
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4890, 4898-99. 
29. S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
4838, 4871. 
30. Remarks of Senator Ribicoff, discussing findings of THE PRIVATE WELFARE PENSION 
PLAN STUDY, 1971, discussed in INTERIM REPORT OF ACTIVITIES OF THE PRIVATE WELFARE 
AND PENSION PLAN STUDY, 1971, S. REP. No. 634, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1971). 
31. Plan termination frequently resulted in the loss of or severe reduction of pension 
benefits. In one of the most noteworthy cases, Studebaker ceased operations in 1963 and 
subsequently terminated its employees' pension plans. Over 4000 workers received barely 
fifteen percent of their promised benefits. See Michael S. Gordon, "Overview: Why Was 
ERISA Enacted?" in SENATE COMM. ON AGING, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME 
SECURITY ACT OF 1974: THE FIRST DECADE, S. REP. No. 221, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 8 
(1984). ERISA now provides for mandatory plan termination insurance through the Pension 
Benefit Guaranty Corporation. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1461 (1988 & Supp. I 1989). 
32. Fraud was, apparently, especially acute in union-dominated plans. For instance, in 
the mid-1960s, a Senate investigation of two New Jersey local unions revealed that the pension 
plan trustee of both unions had established a benefits consulting firm to manage the plans. Not 
only did the trustee charge exorbitant fees for the firm's services, he also diverted over $4 
million in union assets to offshore "charities," of which the trustee was the principal 
shareholder. See id. 
33. Palino v. Casey, 664 F.2d 854 (1st Cir. 1981). 
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that "[a]ny 'time of notice' rule is to some extent arbitrary, "34 and that 
the appropriate measure of adequate notice is "fundamental fairness" 
under the circumstances. 35 The limits of "fundamental fairness" are 
exceeded when no notice is given to those "who, with a minimal effort, 
might easily have avoided the loss of ... pension rights. "36 
The Supreme Court similarly held in Pilot Life Insurance v. Dedeaux 
that the specifics concerning ERISA's fiduciary duties are to be developed 
through a "federal common law of rights and obligations under ERISA-
regulated plans. "37 Thus it is apparent that the intent of the legislature 
and the Supreme Court is that judicial decisions supplement specific 
ERISA disclosure requirements. 
Some argue that "because ERISA expressly provides detailed 
reporting and disclosure rules, a presumption against imposing a fiduciary 
duty to disclose should apply to the extent that imposing such a duty 
would contradict or supplant an express reporting and disclosure 
requirement. "38 However, because the specific reporting requirements 
of ERISA are not linked in any way to the sections on fiduciary 
responsibility, court decisions should be limited only to the extent that 
they reduce or curtail reporting. There is nothing in the language of 
ERISA or in the legislative intent which would prevent the courts from 
imposing additional disclosure requirements. 
C. The Common Law of Trusts 
To regulate fiduciary conduct, ERISA imposes upon fiduciaries39 
two basic duties borrowed from the common law of trusts-the duty of 
loyalty and the duty of care. 40 Each of these general duties is shaped by 
34. !d. at 859. 
35. !d. (quoting Kosty v. Lewis, 319 F.2d 744,748 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 
U.S. 964 (1964). 
36. !d.; see, e.g., Valle v. Joint Plumbing Industry Bd., 623 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1980); 
Argo v. Joint Plumbing Industry Bd., 623 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1980); Burroughs v. Board of 
Trustees of the Pension Trust Fund for Operating Engineers, 542 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1976), 
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1096 (1977). 
37. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987). 
38. Edward E. Bintz, Fiduciary Responsibility Under ERISA: Is There Ever a Fiduciary 
Duty to Disclose?, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 979, 990 (1993). 
39. Unlike the common law of trusts, ERISA defines a fiduciary as one who "exercises 
any discretionary authority or discretionary control" in the management of the plan, or who 
"exercises any authority or control" over the management or disposition of the plan's assets, 
or who "has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration" 
of the plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A). 
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 170 (duty of loyalty), 174 (duty of care) 
(1959). 
In adopting ERISA, Congress intended to "provide rules and remedies similar to those 
under traditional trust law to govern the conduct of fiduciaries." Although the rules and 
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other, more specific ERISA prov1s1ons that affect their scope. For 
example, the prohibited transaction rules41 strengthen the duties of 
loyalty and care by eliminating potential conflicts of interest. The duty 
of loyalty is further bolstered by the noninurement rule, which declares 
that, with certain exceptions, "the assets of the plan shall never inure to 
the benefit of any employer and shall be held for the exclusive purposes 
of providing benefits to participants. "42 
By contrast, the duties of loyalty and care might seem constricted by 
the exception to the prohibited transaction rules which permits officers, 
employees, agents, or other representatives of employers to serve as 
fiduciaries. 43 Without this exception, such a fiduciary would obviously 
violate his duty of loyalty to plan participants because of the simultaneous 
loyalty to the employer. The tension between these two loyalties is at the 
heart of the disclosure arguments. 
remedies are similar to those in trust law, they are not always identical. A House report 
explains why: 
[E]ven where the funding mechanism is in the form of a trust, reliance on 
conventional trust law often is insufficient to adequately protect the interests of plan 
participants and beneficiaries. This is because trust law had developed in the context 
of testamentary and inter vivos trusts (usually designed to pass designated property 
to an individual or small group of persons) with the attendant emphasis on carrying 
out the instructions of the settlor. Thus, if the settlor includes in the trust document 
an exculpatory clause under which the trustee is relieved from liability for certain 
actions which would otherwise constitute a breach of duty, or if the settlor specifies 
that the trustee shall be allowed to make investments which might otherwise be 
considered imprudent, the trust law in many states will be interpreted to allow the 
deviation. In the absence of a fiduciary responsibility section in the present Act, 
courts applying trust law to employee benefit plans have allowed the same kinds of 
deviations, even though the typical employee benefit plan, covering hundreds or even 
thousands of participants, is quite different from the testamentary trust both in purpose 
and in nature. 
H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1973). Congress expected "that the courts will 
interpret this prudent man rule (and the other fiduciary standards) bearing in mind the special 
nature and purpose of employee benefit plans." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d 
Sess. 302 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 5038. 
41. 29 U.S.C. § 1106. The prohibited transaction rules forbid fiduciaries from engaging 
in transactions with so-called parties in interest. See 29 U.S. C. § 1106(a)(l). ERISA provides 
an extensive list of persons who are parties in interest, including fiduciaries, persons providing 
services to the plan, the employer-sponsor of the plan, the union representing employees who 
are covered by the plan, and relatives of individual parties in interest. 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (14). 
The legislative history indicates that the prohibited transaction rules were considered vital 
to upholding strict fiduciary standards by closing a loophole in the federal effort to protect the 
integrity of employee pension and welfare funds against "raiding" by insiders. H. R. REP. No. 
533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4765-66 (statement of 
Senator Javits). 
42. 29 U.S.C. § 1108(c)(3). 
43. § 1108 (c)(3). 
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This provision allowing an exception to the prohibited transactions 
rules is generally regarded as a necessary accommodation of most 
employers' desire to protect their interests by placing their own 
fiduciaries on boards of trustees. Since the majority of plans are 
employer-funded, the risks of plan investment and benefit payment fall 
on the employer. 44 
Despite these risks, the Supreme Court has rejected the argument that 
ERISA's fiduciary standards could or should be affected by potential 
administrative costs to employers. 45 Indeed, under the management-
investment line of cases, courts have strictly construed the fiduciary's 
duties of loyalty and prudence. In the leading case of Donovan v 
Bierwirth, 46 the Second Circuit held that ERISA's duties of loyalty and 
prudence required those plan trustees, who were also officers of the spon-
soring company, to act "with an eye single to the interests of the 
participants and beneficiaries. "47 The court reached this conclusion 
despite the trustees' objections that section 408(c)(3) moderates ERISA's 
fiduciary duties by expressly authorizing corporate officers to serve as 
plan trustees. 48 
44. For an economic analysis that justifies section 29 U .S.C. 1108(c)(3) on the grounds 
that the employer is a fiduciary, see Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA 'sFundamental 
Contradiction: The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1105, 1126-28 (1988). 
Professors Fischel and Langbein argue that, because of the voluntary nature of the plans, 
a rule disallowing employer fiduciaries could reduce the rate of plan formation. /d. at 1127. 
Legislative history may support this proposition: 
Generally, it would appear that the wider or more comprehensive the coverage, 
vesting, and funding, the more desirable it is from the standpoint of national policy. 
However, since these plans are voluntary on the part of the employer and both the 
institution of new pension plans and increases in benefits depend upon employer 
willingness to participate or expand a plan, it is necessary to take into account 
additional costs from the standpoint of the employer. If employers respond to more 
comprehensive coverage, vesting and funding rules by decreasing benefits under 
existing plans or slowing the rate of formation of new plans, little if anything would 
be gained from the standpoint of securing broader use of employee pensions and 
related plans. At the same time, there are advantages in setting minimum standards 
in these areas both to serve as a guideline for employers in establishing or improving 
plans and also to prevent the promise of more in the form of pensions or related 
benefits than eventually is available. 
S.REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4890. 
45. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 114-15 (1989). 
46. 680 F.2d 263 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1069 (1982). 
47. /d. at 271. 
48. The trustees argue that despite the use of the words "solely" and "exclusive" in 
ERISA's loyalty provision, the statute permitted corporate officers to serve as trustees and did 
not forbid trustee actions that had the incidental effect of benefitting the corporation. The court 
agreed with this proposition in general but held that section 404 imposed "a duty on the trustees 
to avoid placing themselves in a position where their acts as officers or directors of the 
corporation will prevent their functioning with the complete loyalty to participants demanded 
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Because, in general, the scope of ERISA's fiduciary duties are drawn 
from the principles of the common law of trusts49 and because the 
statutory language of ERISA is clearly not intended to be a complete 
outline of disclosure requirements, the duty to disclose under ERISA may 
be closely related to, but not limited to, that imposed under the law of 
trusts. In fact, prior to ERISA, trust law was used to determine the duty 
of pension plan administrators. 50 Since ERISA was enacted to provide 
additional protection to pension plan participants and beneficiaries, it 
would be illogical to assert that the duty to disclose is actually reduced 
under the statutory scheme. 
The law of trusts suggests that if one is acting in a fiduciary capacity, 
he has an affirmative duty to disclose pertinent, material information to 
those whose interests he protects. The Restatement (Second) of Trusts 
indicates that a trustee has "a duty to communicate to the beneficiary 
material facts affecting the interest of the beneficiary which he knows the 
beneficiary does not know and which the beneficiary needs to know for 
his protection . . . . "51 This affirmative duty to disclose was not 
generally cited in earlier ERISA-based judicial decisions. However, this 
year in Peachin v. Aetna Life Insumnc~2 the District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois specifically included the duty to disclose as 
outlined in the law of trusts among the duties of fiduciaries. 53 Similarly, 
in Anweiler v. American Electric Power Service, the Seventh Circuit 
concluded that fiduciaries breach their duties when they fail to communi-
cate material facts which affect beneficiaries' interests.54 
It is reasonable to conclude, then, that if it is established that one is 
acting in a fiduciary capacity, the law of trusts would require an 
affirmative duty to disclose material information. Further, both 
legislative intent and recent federal common law suggest that such a 
requirement are not contrary to the statutory intent of ERISA. 
of them as trustees of a pension plan." !d. Thus section 29 U.S.C. 1108(c)(3) simply 
accommodates an employer's desire to protect his interests, but never at the expense of the 
participants. 
49. The fiduciary responsibility provisions of ERISA "codif[y] and mak[e] applicable to 
[ERISA] fiduciaries certain principles developed in the evolution of the law of trusts." 
Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Brunch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 
93-533, at 11 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4649). 
50. See, e.g., Branch v. White, 239 A.2d 665 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div), cert. denied, 
242 A.2d 13 (N.J. 1968); Lix v. Edwards, 147 Cal. Rptr. 294 (Ct. App. 1978); Erion v. 
Timken Co., 368 N.E.2d 312 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976). 
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 173 cmt. d (1959). 
52. Peachin v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., No. 92 C 2739, 1994 WL 61793 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 24, 
1994). 
53. !d. at *6. 
54. Anweiler v. American Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 3 F.3d 986, 991 (7th Cir. 1993). 
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IV. TRIGGERING THE DUTY 1D DISCLOSE 
Considering the statutory language and legislative intent of ERISA 
in combination with the common law of trusts' duty to disclose, it is 
apparent that at least under some conditions ERISA imposes a fiduciary 
duty to disclose information. The more significant question is when that 
duty arises for a plan sponsor which is also acting as a plan administrator 
in a fiduciary capacity. 
The law of trusts and the statutory duties of a fiduciary as outlined 
in ERISA indicate the duty to disclose arises whenever the employer acts 
in his fiduciary capacity, whenever he wears that particular hat. Al-
though some instances are clearly within the domain of fiduciary duty, 
others are less certain. 
One troublesome area involves communication between an employer 
and his employees regarding pension plan modifications-particularly if 
the changes are being considered but have not yet been implemented. 
This is the heart of the "two hat" issue. Businesses frequently argue that 
so long as a plan modification is not implemented, it is still within the 
realm of business decisions and that there is no obligation to disclose 
information concerning it. 
There are significant justifications for imposing fiduciary duties on 
communications between companies acting as plan sponsor/administrator 
and plan participants. These justifications exist despite the fact that more 
disclosure would be required than in situations where the responsibilities 
are held separately. The statutory requirements of a fiduciary under 
ERISA, the law of trusts, and the legislative intent of Congress all 
suggest that allowing communication to trigger fiduciary duty is 
appropriate. 
This paper maintains that the most satisfactory resolution of the 
conflict would be to impose a rebuttable presumption that any communi-
cation between an employer (which is also a plan administrator and a plan 
participant) concerning a plan that launches fiduciary duty and with it the 
duty to disclose information according to the common law of trusts. 
While this is admittedly an expansion of ERISA fiduciary duty as it is 
currently articulated, the position has solid bases of support from the 
statutory language as well as from the recent direction of federal common 
law. 
A. The Statutory Argument 
The notion that communication triggers fiduciary duty receives 
support from the statutory language of ERISA which maintains that a 
person is a fiduciary. The duty is launched, whenever the fiduciary 
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"exercises any discretionary authority or control respecting management 
of [an ERISA] plan or exercises any authority or control respecting 
management or disposition of its assets . . . or he has any discretionary 
authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of such a 
plan. "55 The language does not indicate that a certain level of authority 
or control must be achieved before fiduciary duty commences; rather, if 
the person exercises any discretionary authority or control, he is a 
fiduciary to the extent of that authority. Certainly, when a plan 
administrator is communicating with a plan participant about the plan, he 
is exercising control with regard to both the management of the plan and 
the disposition of its assets. In particular, if the information the adminis-
trator gives or fails to disclose affects a plan member's or potential 
member's participation in a plan, choice of options, amount or distribu-
tion of benefits, etc., then the administrator has exercised some level of 
control over the plan and its assets. Whether the communication has 
effected a plan member is a fact question of materiality and will be case 
specific, but the presumption that the communication-triggered fiduciary 
duty is sound since it necessarily involves the exercise of authority and 
control. 
Under ERISA, once fiduciary duty is triggered, the fiduciary must 
act solely for the benefit of plan participants and beneficiaries. 56 Thus, 
once communication has been initiated, the fiduciary must inform the 
beneficiary "of material facts affecting the interest of the beneficiary 
which he knows and which he knows the beneficiary does not know and 
which the beneficiary needs to know for his protection. "57 Again, the 
language of ERISA is quite clear; the fiduciary's loyalty, once fiduciary 
duty has been triggered, is solely toward the beneficiaries. It is illogical, 
then, to suggest that an employer knows something as a sponsor but does 
not know those same facts as an administrator. If the information 
possessed by the employer is material, if it would be necessary for the 
participants to make an informed choice, then the administrator has a 
responsibility to share that knowledge with the plan participants. Nothing 
in ERISA's fiduciary guidelines suggests that a fiduciary can segregate 
the knowledge he possesses into convenient categories of "plan sponsor" 
and "plan administrator." Rather, ERISA permits separation of duties 
only; a plan sponsor may decide to initiate, amend, or terminate a 
pension plan without triggering his fiduciary duties. However, once 
fiduciary obligations are instituted, the employer is required to act solely 
55. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(i) & (iii). 
56. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1). 
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS§ 173 (1959). 
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for the benefit of the participants and to disclose material information 
necessary for participants to make informed choices. 
Communication between the employer and participants must be 
viewed as the triggering mechanism for fiduciary obligations since the 
employee would consult the employer about benefits in no other capacity. 
It is sensible, therefore, to conclude that an employer is responsible for 
disclosing material information when contacted by employees about the 
plan, and ERISA statutory language supports such an interpretation. 
B. The Federal Common Law Argument 
Recent federal common law also suggests that communication may 
trigger fiduciary duty. While not stating directly that an employer is 
acting in a fiduciary capacity whenever there is communication concern-
ing the pension or benefit plan with an employee, recent courts have 
rightly imposed a duty to refrain from material misrepresentation in such 
instances. 
For example, in Berlin v. Michigan Bell Telephone, 58 Michigan Bell 
offered a special severance pay plan to employees who voluntarily retired 
during a particular window period.59 Later, a second window period 
was designated. 60 Between the two windows, Michigan Bell indicated to 
employees that no new window period would be offered. However, at 
that time, a second period was being seriously considered. 61 A class of 
affected employees asserted that Michigan Bell had breached its fiduciary 
responsibilities by making a material misrepresentation about the second 
window period. 62 While the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
specifically refused to hold that a fiduciary had any duty "to say anything 
at all or to communicate with potential plan participants about the future 
availability [of a subsequent window period], "63 it did conclude that "if 
the plan administrator and/or plan fiduciary does communicate with 
potential plan participants after serious consideration has been given 
concerning a future implementation or offering under the plan, then any 
material misrepresentations may constitute a breach of their fiduciary 
duties. "64 
If communication between the employer and employees concerning 
the pension plan is seen as triggering fiduciary duty, the question arises 
58. Berlin v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 858 F.2d 1154 (6th Cir. 1988). 
59. /d. at 1157-58. 
60. /d. 
61. /d. at 1159-60. 
62. /d. at 1156, 1162-64. 
63. /d. at 1164. 
64. /d. 
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as to what constitutes communication. In Drennan v. General Motors, 65 
while focusing on the issue of material misrepresentation, the court held 
that employers may have a duty to communicate pertinent information to 
employees. In Drennan, laid-off employees who had waived certain 
rights in exchange for a lump sum payment sued General Motors alleging 
breach of fiduciary duty because the company failed to inform them that 
it was seriously considering making a more generous offer. Employees 
had asked management, before accepting a lump sum, about the 
possibility of being covered under the richer plan. Employees were told 
that the more generous settlement would not be available to them. 66 
However, at the time of the employee inquiry, the more favorable 
settlement plan was seriously being considered by General Motors. Thus, 
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit maintained that the corporation 
"was impressed with a fiduciary duty to keep the [employees] abreast of 
its consideration to permit their participation in [the more generous plan] 
so as to enable [the employees] to arrive at a meaningful decision . 
"
67 The court further stated that "the duty to avoid material 
misrepresentations does not require the employer to predict an ultimate 
decision to offer a plan so long as it fairly discloses the progress of its 
serious considerations to make a plan available to affected employees, "68 
although the court also noted that this duty "does not require the fiduciary 
to disclose its internal deliberations . . . . "69 
The court in Drennan based its decision in part on the reasoning of 
the District of Columbia Circuit in Eddy v. Colonial Life. 70 In Eddy, the 
plaintiff asked the insurer about his right to continue his former group 
coverage and was told he had no such rights. In fact, though Eddy did 
not have any rights to continue his policy, he was able to "convert" his 
coverage-a fact Colonial Life did not disclose. The District Court ruled 
for the insurance company, reasoning that Eddy's claims hinged on 
whether he asked about his conversion rights and not about his right to 
continue his coverage under the group policy. Since the District Court 
found that the plaintiff had not proven that he either used the word 
"convert" or otherwise appropriately communicated to the insurance 
company his wish to convert his group coverage, it maintained that the 
65. Drennan v. General Motors Corp., 977 F.2d 246 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 
S. Ct. 2416 (1993). 
66. !d. at 249. 
67. !d. at 252. 
68. !d. at 251. 
69. !d. at 251 (quoting Eddy v. Colonial Life Ins. Co. of Am., 919 F.2d 747, 750). 
70. Eddy v. Colonial Life Ins. Co. of Am., 919 F.2d 747 (D.C. Cir. 1990)(reversing 
Eddy v. Unitag World Travel Serv., Inc., No. 88-1038, Memorandum Order (D.D.C. June 
28, 1989)). 
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insurance company had not breached a fiduciary duty to Eddy. 71 In 
reversing the district court's decision, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit characterized the case as concerning the scope of an insurance 
company's duty to its insureds. The appellate court said that the standard 
of care articulated by the district court was too narrow and held that 
when Eddy explained his situation, Colonial Life had a duty not to 
misinform Eddy, as well as an affirmative responsibility "to convey to 
Eddy complete and correct material information as to his status and his 
conversion options. "72 Regardless of the precision of the bene-
ficiary's question, the fiduciary is under a duty to communicate all 
material facts in connection with a transaction which the fiduciary knows 
or should know. 73 In fact, the court maintained that "[t]he duty to 
disclose material information is the core of a fiduciary's responsibility . 
• • • "
74 The appellate court held that, as ERISA suggests, the duties of 
an ERISA fiduciary are not limited by the statute's express provisions but 
rather include duties derived from common law trust principles. 75 
Indeed, the D.C. Circuit suggested that in some circumstances, a fidu-
ciary must act upon its own initiative to convey material information to 
a beneficiary. 76 The court said that fiduciary duty is not discharged 
simply by the issuance and dissemination of required reports and notices 
of material modifications, etc., but, rather, that fiduciary duty carries 
through in all of the fiduciary's dealing with participants and beneficia-
ries. 77 
Additionally, in Fischer v. Philadelphia Electric, 78 the Third Circuit 
held that even communications which are offered in good faith by 
company personnel may constitute a breach of fiduciary duty if manage-
ment deliberately kept their personnel in the dark about seriously-
71. Eddy v. Unitag World Travel Serv., Inc., No. 88-1038, Memorandum Order 
(D.D.C. June 28, 1989), rev'd, Eddy v. Colonial Life Ins. Co., 919 F. 2d 747 (D.C. Cir. 
1990). 
72. /d. at 752. 
73. Cf. Castello v. Gamache, 593 F.2d 358 (8th Cir. 1979) in which the Eighth Circuit 
affirmed a ruling that pension fund trustees did not violate their fiduciary duty by failing to 
notify a terminated employee of her conversion rights. The D.C. Circuit distinguished Castello, 
noting that there was nothing in the record to suggest that the trustees knew or had had any 
reason to know the facts of the termination, while in Eddy the employee called the insurance 
company to inform them of his situation. 
74. Eddy, 919 F.2d at 750. 
75. /d. at 750. 
76. /d. at 750. 
77. /d. at 750. See also Mullins v. Pfizer, Inc., 23 F.3d 663 (2d Cir. 1994); Anweiler 
v. American Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 3 F.3d 986 (7th Cir. 1993); lwans v. Aetna Life Ins. 
Corp., 855 F. Supp. 579 (D. Conn. 1994). 
78. Fischer v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 994 F.2d 130 (3rd Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 
S. Ct. 622 (1993). 
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considered plan modifications. The court noted that "the fiduciary 
obligations owed to the plan participants were owed by [Philadelphia 
Electric] as plan administrator. These obligations cannot be circumvented 
by building a 'Chinese wall' around those employees on whom plan 
participants reasonably rely for important information and guidance . 
,79 
Finally, within the last year the District Court for the Northern 
District of Illinois indicated more directly that communication may indeed 
trigger fiduciary responsibility. In Peachin v. Aetna Life Insumnce80 the 
plaintiff, Peachin, sought to recover medical expenses from Aetna which 
had processed the claims of Peachin's employer, Laventhol and Horwath 
(L&H). Although Aetna was no longer the underwriter of the health plan, 
Aetna knew that (L&H) had not informed plan participants of the change. 
Aetna further knew that because the procedures for filing claims, etc. had 
not altered, participants would not know of the modification. 81 In 
denying Aetna's motion to dismiss, the court held that "if L&H gave 
Aetna discretion to communicate with employees concerning the plan, 
then Aetna had a duty to do so with loyalty and care. This duty derives 
from the fiduciary duties imposed by ERISA. "82 Although Aetna was 
not named as a plan administrator in the plan documents, the court held 
that it was nevertheless a fiduciary because it had the discretion to 
communicate with employees and because "ERISA is not that formalis-
tic. "83 Rather, the trigger for fiduciary duties, according to the district 
court, is "actually perform[ing] the function" 84 of a fiduciary, and the 
court viewed communication as such a function. 
Admittedly, Peachin v. Aetna is a somewhat isolated holding. While 
the recent direction of the courts seems clearly toward the imposition of 
fiduciary duties upon communications which misrepresent material facts, 
there is a definite reluctance to expand the duty to disclose to silences and 
non-communications. Courts generally have indicated that the "business 
decision" prerogative was fully intended by ERISA legislation. 
There is some evidence that while the main purpose of ERISA was 
to protect the pensions and benefits of employees, there was also a 
concern that the regulations not unduly burden the private pension 
system. As Senator Long indicated, "We know that new pension plans 
79. Id. at 135. 
80. Peach in v. Aetna Life Ins. Co, No. 92 C 2739, 1994 WL 61793 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 24, 
1994). 
81. ld. at *1. 
82. ld. at *5. 
83. ld. at *6. 
84. Id. 
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will not be adopted and that existing plans will not be expanded and 
liberalized if the costs are made overly burdensome, particularly for 
employers who generally foot most of the bill. "85 Businesses argue that 
to generate a continuing stream of information about all possible 
amendments to a plan would be costly and burdensome. Further, some 
courts have held that since Congress specifically allowed businesses to 
wear "two hats," that it could not have "intended to penalize those 
corporations [choosing to wear both] by requiring greater disclosure of 
business decisions from them than from corporations acting solely as plan 
sponsors. "86 
The fear of penalizing dual-acting businesses is unnecessary. There 
are clear financial advantages for a company which chooses to function 
as both a plan sponsor and plan administrator. By sharing the duties, an 
employer can use information about the plan in making business 
decisions. For example, there are tax breaks available when money is 
shifted at appropriate times. However, justice dictates that the benefits 
should be reciprocal. If by opting to fill both roles concurrently, the 
employer as sponsor obtains valuable information which assists him in his 
fiduciary duties to company owners and shareholders, he must accept the 
fact that the information he receives as sponsor is subject to his duty as 
a plan administrator. 
This does not suggest that the concept of a business decision is 
entirely eliminated. It is well known that a company is not required to 
inform shareholders of every deliberation, but only of those decisions or 
plans which have been sufficiently adopted so that knowledge of them 
would be considered material in making an informed decision. Similarly, 
an employer as administrator would be required to disclose only those 
proposals, plans, etc. which would affect the participants' ability to 
protect their rights under the plan. It is this distinction which seems at 
the core of court analyses separating amendments merely being discussed 
from those being "seriously considered." In practice this issue would 
continue to be a question of fact for the particular situation. Neverthe-
less, the presumption would be that communication triggers fiduciary 
duty, and that when plan administrators discuss the plan with participants, 
information about even potential modifications, etc. must be shared if 
doing so would be in the interest of the participant. 
85. 120 CONG. REC. 29,945 (1974). 
86. Payonk v. HMW Indus., 883 F.2d 221, 232 (3rd Cir. 1989) (Stapleton, !., 
concurring). 
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C. Dealing with Silence 
There is ample case law requiring that an employer, when ques-
tioned, refrain from misleading or misinforming plan participants. 
Because these cases hold that communication triggers fiduciary duty, the 
question of whether silence can insulate an employer is partially resolved. 
An employer generally is presumed to have an affirmative duty to dis-
close material information to plan participants when questioned, thus 
eliminating the "Chinese wall" shield. 
The bigger problem may lie in determining whether there is an 
affirmative duty to disclose information when the employer has not been 
questioned by plan participants. Specifically, if the employee does not 
initiate communication, is the fiduciary duty ever triggered? Again, the 
reasoning suggested by recent court decisions may provide an answer. 
Where silence on a particular proposed amendment, etc. may in itself 
communicate that no such change is being anticipated and may, thus, 
adversely influence a participant's ability to make an informed decision, 
a fiduciary duty arises. For example, in Anweiler v. American Electric, 
the Seventh Circuit concluded that fiduciaries breach their duties of 
loyalty and care when they fail to communicate material facts affecting 
the beneficiaries' interests-even when the information was not requested 
by the beneficiaries. 87 Similarly, in Peachin v. Aetna the court expressly 
rejected Aetna's contention that L&H employees had a duty "to certify 
that the plan operated as they believed. "88 On the contrary, the court 
maintained that "[t]his argument is especially unconvincing ... where 
employees had virtually no reason to suspect that their health care plan 
had changed. "89 This is consistent since non-communication in this 
instance is, in fact, communication and therefore launches fiduciary 
obligations. Where saying nothing is essentially saying something, courts 
should be free to find a breach of fiduciary duty. 
Further, the trust principles underlying ERISA impose an affirmative 
duty to disclose information known by the fiduciary but unknown to the 
beneficiary if that information is necessary for the protection of the 
beneficiary's interests. Trust law treats silence as a potential breach and 
judicial interpretation of ERISA should demand no less since ERISA was 
enacted as a remedial measure to provide additional, undiminished, 
employee protection. 
87. See Anweiler v. American Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 3 F.3d 986, 991 (7th Cir. 
1993). 
88. Peachin v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., No. 92 C 2739, 1994 WL 61793, at *10 (N.D. Ill. 
Feb. 24, 1994). 
89. !d. at 10. 
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This does not suppose that every silence would, or should, be 
construed as a breach of fiduciary duty. Decisions in this area would 
continue to be highly fact specific, requiring analysis not unlike that of 
the "seriously considered" determinations in Drennan, etc. The court 
would have to find that the undisclosed information was sufficiently 
certain to be considered "known" by the fiduciary and, further, that the 
information was "material" in terms of protection of the beneficiaries' 
interests. 
The presumption that non-disclosure of a material fact could 
constitute a breach of fiduciary duty, however, could prevent employers 
from hiding behind a wall of silence, insulated by the failure of plan 
participants to divine that they ought to initiate communication about a 
modification of which they have no knowledge. 
D. Practical Effects on Employers 
Despite the burdens that business insists would result from imposition 
of an expanded fiduciary duty to disclose in ERISA cases, the actual 
effects would probably be limited because only potential plan changes 
being seriously considered would be subject to disclosure. That same 
standard is currently being used to determine whether information has 
been misrepresented to plan participants, so no greater burden of proof 
would be required. That is, as noted in Fischer, whether statements 
constitute affirmative misrepresentations is a question for the trier of fact. 
If an affirmative misrepresentation is found, whether it is "material" is 
"a mixed question of law and fact" based on whether "there is a substan-
tial likelihood that it would mislead a reasonable employee in making an 
informed decision. "90 Whether a plan is under "serious consideration" 
at a given time is made relevant to materiality. 91 "All else equal, the 
more seriously a plan change is being considered, the more likely a 
misrepresentation, e.g., that no change is under consideration, will pass 
the threshold of materiality. "92 Silence would be evaluated against 
similar criteria and would be highly fact specific. 
Further, while a company might decide that in some instances it is 
advisable to inform all plan participants of impending modifications, in 
90. Fischer v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 994 F.2d 130, 135 (3rd Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 
114 S. Ct. 622 (1993). 
91. /d.; cf. Berlin v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 858 F.2d 1154, 1163-64 (6th Cir. 1988). 
92. Fischer, 994 F.2d at 135. This is similar to the materiality test in cases involving 
securities transactions, where materiality of facts relating to a particular event depends upon 
"'both the indicated probability that the event will occur and the anticipated magnitude of the 
event .... '" Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 238 (1988) (quoting SEC v. Texas Gulf 
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968)). 
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general the employer is likely to be able to identify the participants or 
classes of participants which would be most affected by the changes. It 
could provide immediate notification about proposed changes in 
retirement options, for example, only to those employees scheduled for 
retirement in the next two years, etc. Other employees could be 
informed following ERISA statutory disclosure requirements. 
Naturally, a company might decide that a continuing flow of 
information to all participants would be the surest way to limit liability, 
and though the cost of that information pipeline might be significant, it 
is unlikely to prove as devastating as businesses have suggested. Benefit 
plans are rarely revised several times annually, and it is not at all 
uncommon for plans to designate a specific period during which plan 
changes for the following year are announced. Such "pre-implementa-
tion" announcements may in many cases be deemed sufficient disclosure 
to preclude a claim of breach of fiduciary duty. Furthermore, the costs 
associated with continuing notification would almost certainly be less than 
those of litigation. 
Finally, a company which considered the costs of complying with an 
affirmative duty to disclose to be too high could always opt instead to 
sever the responsibilities of plan sponsor and plan administrator. By 
giving up the advantages of wearing two hats, an employer could also 
free itself of the burdens. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Courts should continue along the path of several recent circuit and 
district court decisions toward requiring increased accountability and 
disclosure from ERISA employers which choose to function both as 
pension plan sponsors and administrators. While the disclosure required 
in a given situation will be a mixed question of law and fact, there should 
be a presumption that communication triggers fiduciary duty and that 
fiduciary duty presumes an obligation to disclose as outlined in the 
common law of trusts. 
Employer silence about material facts should be viewed as misleading 
communication, and therefore as a possible breach of fiduciary duties, 
particularly when that silence substantially impairs an affected employee's 
ability to make an informed decision regarding his rights and benefits. 
Finally, companies which would find the duty to disclose overly 
burdensome should not function in the dual capacities of sponsor and 
administrator. Courts should clearly indicate that it is the employer's 
responsibility to insure that it is not put in a position of compromising its 
fiduciary duties to either its shareholders or plan participants. The courts 
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must reiterate that employers which opt to wear two hats may find that 
there is always a cap on their heads. 
Mary 0. Jensen 
